REACHING TOO FAR?
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
REGARDING THE SCOPE OF ARBITRATION
CLAUSES IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS
Daniel T. Lloyd*
This Comment examines side agreements of collective bargaining
agreements (“CBAs”), specifically the extent to which a CBA’s arbitration
clause can be applied to a seemingly related side agreement. There is
somewhat of a universal agreement that in certain circumstances it is
appropriate to apply the terms of a CBA’s arbitration clause to a related
side agreement. It is unclear, however, what courts should use as the
requisite threshold test for determining applicability. This Comment
analyzes the current circuit split over the appropriate standard to utilize
when determining the applicability of a CBA’s arbitration clause to a side
agreement.
INTRODUCTION
As the United States’ national economy has expanded, so have the
complexity and sophistication of labor negotiations and labor agreements.
Workers yearning for the many potential benefits to be gained by collective
bargaining often enter into elaborate agreements with their employers. 1 In
the modern era, CBAs have become commonplace in American labor law. 2
Despite many legal opinions and cases discussing CBAs, a lesser-known
area of controversy is the law regarding side agreements to CBAs. The
process of crafting an agreement that is satisfactory to all parties involved
in complex labor negotiations is extremely difficult, and as a result,
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Pennsylvania Law School, B.A., 2005,
American University
1. See United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (describing how the
proliferation of collective bargaining agreements has been, in part, spurred by an increase in
the complexity of employment relationships).
2. See id.
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employers and labor unions often enter into side agreements for any
number of reasons. 3 Side agreements allow both labor unions and
employers to modify their existing relationship and to concurrently avoid
the risk of opening up the existing CBA for negotiation on other unrelated
issues. 4
Disagreements and litigation have always coexisted with CBAs and
related side agreements. Modern labor policy emphasizes that the preferred
forum for disputed CBAs is arbitration, rather than typical court
proceedings. 5 As a result, arbitration clauses have become a mainstay in
most modern CBAs. 6 Side agreements, which are often far less complex
than the CBAs they are related to, do not always explicitly contain a
separate arbitration clause. 7 While a cursory evaluation would seem to
indicate that an agreement without an arbitration clause cannot be subject
to mandatory arbitration, in certain circumstances courts have held that
related side agreements can be subject to the CBA’s arbitration clause.
These holdings are grounded in the strong policy preference for arbitration
and the inter-related nature of CBAs and side agreements. 8
Most courts agree that there are circumstances in which a side
agreement to a CBA can be subject to the terms of the CBA’s arbitration
clause. However, there is currently a split between the circuits over the test
that should be applied to determine when an arbitration clause should be
held applicable. The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits consider a
side agreement to be a part of the CBA. 9 After establishing that a side
agreement is part of the CBA, these courts then determine whether the side
agreement would have fallen within the scope of the CBA’s arbitration
clause. 10 Alternatively, the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits consider
the relatedness of the side agreement to the CBA when reviewing whether

3. Certain past cases involve a employer and a union entering into a new side
agreement, rather than revising the original CBA. See United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 F.3d 271 (6th Cir. 2007); United Steelworkers v. Duluth
Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2005); Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Group,
279 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2002).
4. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 274; Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d at 787; Dutra Group,
279 F.3d at 1077.
5. See Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 566 (emphasizing the preference of modern courts
for labor disputes to be handled by arbitrators).
6. See id.
7. See Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d 271; Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d 786; Dutra Group,
279 F.3d 1075.
8. See Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 274; Dutra Group, 279 F.3d at 1077; Duluth Clinic,
Ltd., 413 F.3d at 787.
9. See generally Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279
F.3d at 1080; Niro v. Fearn Int’l, Inc., 827 F.2d 173, 175 (7th Cir. 1987); L.O. Koven &
Bro., Inc. v. Local Union 5767, United Steelworkers, 381 F.2d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1967).
10. See Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 279; Dutra Group, 279 F.3d at 1080.
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an arbitration clause of a CBA should be applied to a side agreement. 11
Side agreements deemed collateral are not subject to the terms of the
CBA’s arbitration clause, while those not deemed collateral are subject to
the CBA’s arbitration clause. 12
This Comment will analyze the circuit split over which standard is
appropriate to utilize when determining the applicability of a CBA’s
arbitration clause to a related side agreement. In doing so, I will analyze
each of the seven primary cases that serve as the framework for this
disagreement. Applying the reasoning of United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., I argue that the scope test is preferable to the
collateral test because the former is more stable. 13 While conceivably more
technically correct, the collateral test marginalizes the stability and
predictability that is an essential component of the American legal
tradition.
Part I of this Comment examines the historical background of CBAs
with a focus on the case law and legislative history that provide the
framework for the debate over side agreements to CBAs. Part II focuses on
the seven cases comprising the circuit split over the applicability of a
CBA’s arbitration clause to a related side agreement. Part II also details
and emphasizes the circuits’ reasoning for reaching their differing
conclusions. In Part III, this Comment examines the potential ramifications
of this split, along with the possibility of a Supreme Court resolution of this
split. Finally, this Comment will emphasize the superiority of the scope
test over the collateral test.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ARBITRATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS

In 1935, Congress took one of its most important steps toward the
regulation of the organized labor market. The National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) was Congress’ first attempt at managing labor relations. 14
After twelve years of regulation under the NLRA, Congress amended it to
include the National Labor Management Relations Act (NLMRA). 15 One
11. See Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d at 788-89; Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 2300,
United Auto. Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers, 942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1991);
Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 831-32 (4th Cir. 1985).
12. See Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d at 789; Cornell Univ., 942 F.2d at 140; Adkins,
771 F.2d at 831-32.
13. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278-79 (discussing the scope test as applied by the Third,
Seventh and Ninth Circuits).
14. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2002)).
15. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000)).
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of the NLMRA’s primary purposes was to change the way that labor suits
would be brought. 16 Section 301 of the NLMRA created automatic federal
standing for parties claiming breach of a CBA. 17 As a result, federal
district courts became the courts of original jurisdiction for many labor
claims. 18
For the next thirteen years, the federal courts resolved the majority of
labor disputes. However, this structure changed with the “Steelworkers
Trilogy,” a series of cases decided in 1960 that had a dramatic effect on
federal labor law. 19 The Steelworkers Trilogy paved the way for arbitration
to become the primary form of resolution for collective bargaining
disputes. 20 In United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 21 the
Supreme Court declared that the federal courts should grant strong
deference to arbitration. Accordingly, the Court held that as long as the
arbitration is reasonable, the federal courts should defer to arbitrators’
judgments in collective bargaining disputes. 22 In United Steelworkers of
America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 23 which was decided in the same
year, the Court strongly argued in favor of an increased use of arbitration as
a means to promote industrial peace and stability. In doing so, the Court in
Warrior & Gulf Navigation noted that while arbitration is not a substitute
for litigation, the increased use of arbitration in collective bargaining
disputes would be beneficial to the national labor market. 24 While holding
that federal courts should not force arbitration upon unwilling parties, the
Court created a strong presumption in favor of arbitration for collective
bargaining disputes. 25 Since these decisions, the Supreme Court has
frequently emphasized its preference for and its deference to arbitrations. 26
II.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Currently, the circuits of the United States Court of Appeals are

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigating Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
20. Am. Mfg. Corp., 363 U.S. 564; Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 574; Enter.
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 593.
21. 363 U.S. at 596-97 (1960) (discussing the benefits provided by an arbitrator).
22. Id. at 593.
23. 363 U.S. at 578.
24. Id. at 578-80.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17,
531 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (affirming the Court’s prior holdings on the arbitration of labor
disputes); AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 647-51 (1986).
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almost evenly split over the question of when to apply the arbitration clause
of a CBA to a related side agreement. The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth circuits have adopted the “Scope Test.” 27 Conversely, the Second,
Fourth, and Eighth circuits apply the “Collateral Test.” 28
A.

The Scope Test

In the four cases that provide the framework for the scope test, labor
unions brought suit against their employers to seek arbitration to help
resolve their disputes. 29 In all four circuits, the courts involved held that
the scope test was the proper test to determine when to apply a CBA’s
arbitration clause to a related side agreement. 30
The courts articulated a two-step process. In the first step, the courts
interpret the related side agreement as if it was part of the original CBA. 31
The courts attempt to create a hypothetical agreement that contains both the
related side agreement and the CBA, along with the CBA’s arbitration
clause. 32 In the second step, the courts examine this new agreement,
focusing on the new terms provided by the side agreement in light of the
arbitration clause. 33 If the terms of the arbitration clause would cause the
side agreement’s provisions to be arbitrated, then courts will decide in
favor of arbitration. 34 Conversely, if the terms of the arbitration clause
would dictate that the provisions of the side agreement are not subject to
arbitration, then the courts will find against extending the CBA’s
arbitration clause to the related side agreement. 35

27. See generally United Steelworkers of Am. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 F.3d
278 (6th Cir. 2007); Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1075, 1080
(9th Cir. 2002); Niro v. Fearn Int’l, Inc., 827 F.2d 173, 175 (7th Cir. 1987); L.O. Koven &
Bro., Inc. v. Local Union 5767, United Steelworkers, 381 F.2d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1967).
28. See United Steelworkers v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d 788-89 (8th Cir. 2005);
Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 2300, United Auto. Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers,
942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1991); Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 831-32 (4th
Cir. 1985).
29. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d 271; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279 F.3d 1075; Niro,
827 F.2d 173; L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d 196.
30. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279 F.3d at 1080;
Niro, 827 F.2d at 175; L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 201.
31. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279 F.3d at 1080;
Niro, 827 F.2d at 175; L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 201.
32. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279 F.3d at 1080;
Niro, 827 F.2d at 175; L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 201.
33. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279 F.3d at 1080;
Niro, 827 F.2d at 175; L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 201.
34. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279 F.3d at 1080;
Niro, 827 F.2d at 175; L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 201.
35. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279 F.3d at 1080;
Niro, 827 F.2d at 175; L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 201.
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The Third Circuit

The issue of the applicability of the arbitration clause of a CBA to a
related side agreement was first examined in L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc. v.
Local Union 5767, United Steelworkers. 36 In Koven, the steelworkers’
union argued for arbitration of a claim related to vacation pay. 37 While the
United States District Court of New Jersey initially held in favor of the
employer and against arbitration, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed, finding in favor of the union and constructing what eventually
became the modern day scope test. 38 In 1964, the union and Koven
settled. 39 This settlement agreement became the side agreement at issue in
this case. 40 While the main CBA contained an arbitration clause, the
settlement agreement did not. 41 Following the settlement, a dispute arose
regarding whether Koven was correctly tabulating its employees’ vacation
time. 42 Part of this dispute related directly to terms featured exclusively in
The union argued that the settlement
the settlement agreement. 43
agreement should be arbitrated in the same manner as the claims under the
CBA; Koven, on the other hand, argued that the settlement agreement
should not be subject to the arbitration clause. 44
At the outset, the Third Circuit noted that there was only a small
amount of settled law in this area. 45 While one may predict that a lack of
jurisprudence in this area would cause courts to devote considerable time
and analysis to its decision, the exact opposite occurred in Koven. The
Court held that “unless a release explicitly discharges the parties from the
collective bargaining agreement itself . . . its effect should be determined
by an arbitral forum.” 46 Instead of devoting time to determining the proper
standard to utilize, the Court, in little more than a sentence, elected to use
the scope test. 47
The Third Circuit provided little justification for its position and
explained in a single paragraph the creation of the scope test, the reason for
it being the proper standard for the instant case, and its application to the

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

381 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1967).
Id. at 199.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199.
Id.
L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 199.
Id.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 205.
Id.
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facts at hand. 48 The Court’s main justification for creating the scope test
was that it wanted to let arbitrators handle as many issues as possible due to
the arbitrator’s expertise. 49 The Court labeled arbitrators as being “expertly
atuned [sic]” to the types of issues in contention. 50 Because of this alleged
expertise, the Court held that all of the issues that are not explicitly out of
the scope of the arbitration clause should be subject to arbitration,
including issues raised in related side agreements. 51
2.

The Seventh Circuit

The next case addressing this issue, Niro v. Fearn Int’l, 52 was decided
in 1987, two years after the Fourth Circuit decided in Adkins v. Time World
Co. to utilize the collateral test instead of the scope test. 53 In Niro, the
Seventh Circuit dealt with a dispute arising from a claim related to a
wrongful termination. 54 After losing at the district court level, Niro’s
former employer appealed and argued that since the source of the wrongful
termination was a related side agreement and not the CBA itself, the CBA’s
arbitration clause should not apply. 55 The Seventh Circuit disagreed and
affirmed the decision of the district court, and, consequently, ensconced the
scope test as part of its precedent. 56
Dominic Niro was an employee for Fearn International, Inc. and a
member of Local 744 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 57 In
1984, Fearn fired Niro, who had a history of drug and alcohol use, under
the terms of the existing CBA. 58 After his termination, Fearn, the union,
and Niro reached a settlement agreement that allowed Niro to return to
work. 59 After creating this agreement, Fearn again terminated Niro. 60 On
this occasion, Fearn fired Niro under the auspices of the settlement
agreement, not the CBA. 61 Niro attempted to seek arbitration under the
CBA for his second termination, but Fearn argued that the CBA’s
arbitration clause should not be applied to the related side agreement. 62
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 204-05.
Id. at 205.
Id.
Id. at 204.
Niro v. Fearn Int’l, Inc., 827 F.2d 173, 175 (7th Cir. 1987).
Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 831-32 (4th Cir. 1985).
Niro, 827 F.2d at 174.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id.
Niro, 827 F.2d at 174.
Id.
Id.
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The Seventh Circuit’s analysis clearly mirrors the Third Circuit’s
reasoning. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., the Seventh Circuit asserted that there were strong policy
reasons supporting the use of arbitration in these types of disputes. 63
However, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis was more in depth than the Third
Circuit’s analysis, partially because there was a much greater volume of
case law to rely upon. 64 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit held that the scope
test was the appropriate standard and that because Niro’s second
termination was within the scope of the CBA’s arbitration clause, it should
be subject to arbitration. 65
The Seventh Circuit’s justification for utilizing the scope test is based
on a two-prong approach. The Court’s first justification is a reiteration of
the Third Circuit’s justification in Koven. Although the Seventh Circuit did
not explicitly say that arbitrators were better equipped to handle these types
of issues, the Court frequently cited the existence of strong policy reasons
favoring arbitration. 66 Even though the Court did not detail the policy
reasons, the expertise of arbitrators discussed in Koven would likely be
among the reasons to adopt the scope test.
The Court’s second justification for utilizing the scope test was its
desire to respect the wishes of the contracting parties. The Court posited
that while a party could not be subject to arbitration against its will, the
inclusion of an arbitration clause places the onus on the contracting parties
to show why a dispute should not be covered by it. 67 Specifically, the
Court, citing Warrior, looked for specific enunciations of the areas to be
covered and the areas not to be considered under the arbitration clause. 68
In the absence of one or both of these instances, the Court held that there
was a strong preference for disputed issues to be arbitrated. 69
3.

The Ninth Circuit

In Inlandboatmens Union of the Pac. v. Dutra Group, 70 the Ninth
Circuit delivered a thorough and compelling discussion on the issue of the
applicability of the arbitration clause of a CBA on a related side agreement.
Unlike some of the other circuits, the Ninth Circuit in Dutra acknowledged
the existence of relevant, yet conflicting, precedents. 71 Of all of the cases
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 175.
Id.
Id. at 176.
Niro, 827 F.2d at 175.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1079-80.
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in this area, Dutra provides the most comprehensive analysis of the issue,
with the Court ultimately choosing the scope test. 72
The Inlandboatmens Union (IBU) represents deckhands in the San
Francisco Bay Area. 73 In November 1997, the IBU filed a grievance
alleging that Dutra violated their subcontracting agreement with the union
when they hired non-union workers to provide service for a boat Dutra
rented from the IBU. 74 The CBA between Dutra and the IBU stated that
Dutra would only hire IBU-represented personnel. 75 Dutra settled the
dispute with the IBU through a five-element settlement agreement. 76
While the settlement forbade Dutra from hiring non-IBU laborers in the
future, they soon reneged on this part of the settlement. 77
Citing Warrior, the Ninth Circuit artfully opined that a CBA is not
meant to be construed in the same manner as a normal contract. 78 The
Court stated that CBA’s are meant to be “generalized code[s]” 79 designed
to “govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly
anticipate.” 80
In this case, the Ninth Circuit addressed a major concern with the
breadth of arbitration clauses. With Warrior in mind, the Court indicated
that the breadth of the arbitration clause is one of, if not the most,
determinative factor for the Court to review. 81 If the arbitration clause is
sufficiently broad, the Ninth Circuit inferred that the parties intended to
include any agreement that could potentially fall within its scope. 82
Likewise, the Court envisioned a spectrum where narrowly tailored
arbitration clauses would result in fewer arbitrations, while broad clauses
would yield frequent arbitrations.
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion is helpful because it thoroughly examines
the contrasting viewpoints on the applicability of a CBA’s arbitration
clause to related side agreements. The Court rejected the collateral test and
argued that Supreme Court precedent, namely Warrior and the
Steelworkers Trilogy, requires the scope test. 83 Regardless of precedent,
the Court (1) argues that stability dictates choosing the scope test over the

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1077.
Id.
Id.
279 F.3d at 1075.
Id.
Id. at 1079.
Id. (citing Warrior, 363 U.S. at 578-80).
Id.
Id. at 1080.
279 F.3d at 1080-81.
Id.

246

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:1

collateral test; 84 and (2) finds that the collateral test was inherently unstable
because the goal of labor law is, and should remain, industrial peace and
stability. 85 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that it had no choice but to adopt
the scope test. 86
4.

The Sixth Circuit

The most recent case to address this issue, United Steelworkers of
America v. Cooper Tire and Rubber Co., 87 employs the scope test, which is
preferred by the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits. Decided in 2007,
Cooper Tire and Rubber Co. echoes the language and reasoning of the
Ninth Circuit’s 2001 Dutra opinion. 88 The Sixth Circuit, relying heavily
on the precedent of Warrior, adopts the scope test analysis. 89
Cooper Tire and Rubber is a rubber and tire manufacturer with major
Since 1941, Cooper and the United
operation plants in Ohio. 90
Steelworkers of America entered into a series of CBAs dealing with issues
such as wages and benefits. 91 The CBA in question had a broad arbitration
clause stating that “[a]ny grievance or dispute which remains unsettled
after following the Grievance Procedure outlined above may be appealed to
arbitration by the party desiring arbitration.” 92
Since 1991, Cooper had, as a part of its employee pension program,
sent out letters detailing the company’s annual contribution to retiree
healthcare benefits. 93 However, these letters did not contain any language
relating to arbitration or other grievance procedures. 94 Between 2000 and
2003, Cooper Tire and Rubber attempted to adjust the caps placed on the
benefits paid to retired workers. 95 In 2004, the union sued Cooper Tire and
Rubber to compel arbitration over this issue, arguing that the terms of the
letters fell under the coverage of the CBA’s arbitration clause. 96
Using nearly identical language to the Ninth Circuit in Dutra, 97 the
Sixth Circuit pointed to Warrior’s holding that a CBA was “more than a

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1081.
Id.
Id.
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 F.3d 278, 279 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 279-81.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 273.
Id. 273-75.
Id. at 274.
474 F.3d at 274.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 275-76.
Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2002).
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contract” 98 and should be construed to be a “generalized code to govern a
myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.” 99 Similar
to Dutra, the Sixth Circuit rationalized that one of the primary motivating
factors of labor law should be industrial peace and stability, a goal that the
collateral test did not further. 100 The Sixth Circuit added that the
ramifications of the scope test were more easily anticipated by the
contracting parties, as parties can more easily determine the breadth of their
arbitration clauses. 101
5.

Analysis of the Scope Test

To the average person, the scope test appears to be the more favorable
of the two current alternatives. The scope test provides an ease of use not
commonly found in complex labor negotiations. Given its usability, there
is a strong argument to be made for the scope test’s ability to provide
greater stability in labor disputes. However, the scope test presents a
potentially major problem: circumvention. While possibly flawed, the
scope test is a strong contender against the more elaborate collateral test.
One of the major benefits of the scope test is that it is much easier to
apply than the collateral test. Whereas the collateral test examines many
competing factors, 102 the scope test only analyzes the CBA’s arbitration
clause. As is evident in some of the above case law, one could create a
continuum ranging from the most comprehensive to the least
comprehensive arbitration clauses, as in Dutra. 103 For particularly broad
arbitration clauses, the presumption will be in favor of arbitration of the
side agreement in contention. Conversely, for extremely restrictive
arbitration clauses, there will be a presumption against extending the
arbitration clause to cover related side agreements.
The scope test could also be considered superior because it better
promotes stability and predictability. This was the primary motivation
behind its adoption by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. The notion that the
scope test is more predictable stems from its ease of application. In theory,
parties should be able to examine their own CBA, analyze its breadth, and
then easily determine if a side agreement will fall under it. The courts that
are in favor of the scope test seem to create a “buyer-beware” situation. In
other words, parties that opt to create ultra-inclusive arbitration clauses

98. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 F.3d 280 (6th Cir.
2007) (quoting Warrior, 363 U.S. at 582).
99. Id. at 278 n.8 (citing Warrior, 363 U.S. at 578-89).
100. Id. at 280.
101. Id.
102. See infra Part II.B.1. (providing a deeper analysis of the collateral test).
103. 279 F. 3d. at 1080.
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designed to cover almost any type of dispute that could arise out of the
agreement will be have to face the consequences of arbitrating every
dispute, even if it arises out of a side agreement and not the CBA.
However, the scope test does have two potential drawbacks. First, it
places a heavy burden on parties to exercise foresight. With the scope test,
courts envision parties crafting a CBA and anticipating these side
agreements. The paradox is that the main reason many side agreements
come into existence is because they often address factors that could not be
foreseen during the CBA’s creation.
The second major drawback of the scope test is that it potentially
circumvents the parties’ intent, a major criticism by the collateral test’s
advocates. 104 The conflict between the scope and collateral tests is
emblematic of a much larger conflict in the law: the conflict between
textualism and intentionalism. A textualist would favor the scope test,
while an intentionalist would favor the collateral test. 105 Some would fault
the scope test for not taking into account the intent of the parties and
deciding solely based on the plain meaning of the arbitration clause. This
and other arguments frequently lodged against textualism can be used
against the scope test as well. An argument can be made that the central
holding in Warrior is an unfair circumvention of the parties’ potential
intent, as parties may not intend for a CBA to be used as the code by which
to judge areas that are not explicitly mentioned in the CBA.
Despite its drawbacks, the scope test is certainly an effective way to
handle side agreements. While not perfect, it provides a simple mechanism
that provides parties some level of certainty regarding whether or not a
court will be willing to extend an arbitration clause to apply to a side
agreement. Overall, both textualists and courts advocate the scope test
because of its simplicity and ease. 106

104. See United Steelworkers v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2005)
(ignoring certain phrases and formatting choices in the CBA that suggest that the arbitrator
has the power to interpret the CBA).
105. Textualists argue that the best meaning of language is the plain meaning, while
intentionalists argue that the meaning of language should be derived from the intent of the
creators of the language. See Paul Killebrew, Where Are All the Left Wing Textualists? 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895, 1897 (2007); Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A
Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 773 (2008) (both
presenting modern views regarding the ongoing debate between textualism and
intentionalism).
106. Courts usually adopt the scope test because of its simplicity and predictability. See
Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 280; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1081
(9th Cir. 2002).
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The Collateral Test

In the three cases that provide the framework for the collateral test,
labor unions sued their employers and sought arbitration of their
disputes. 107 In all three circuits, the courts held that the collateral test was
the proper test to determine when to apply the CBA’s arbitration clause to a
related side agreement.
The collateral test examines the relatedness of the side agreement to a
CBA. 108 Specifically, the court evaluates how independent the side
agreement is to the CBA. 109 Side agreements that, while related, are
independent enough to exist without the CBA are held to be collateral and
insufficiently related to the source CBA for the CBA’s arbitration clause to
be held applicable. 110 Conversely, side agreements that are so extensively
interrelated and entwined with the original CBA that they could not exist
independently without the CBA are held to not be collateral. 111 With noncollateral agreements that are tremendously interconnected with the CBA,
the courts have utilized the CBA’s arbitration clause in disputes over their
related side agreements. 112
1.

The Fourth Circuit

Nearly twenty years after the Third Circuit’s decision in Koven, the
Fourth Circuit became the second court to rule on the issue of the
applicability of a CBA’s arbitration clause to a related side agreement. In
Adkins v. Time World Co., 113 the Fourth Circuit laid the foundation for
what would eventually come to be known as the collateral test.
Adkins was the named plaintiff in a group of journeyman printers who
brought an action against Times World, the Roanoke Typographical Union,
and the International Typographical Union. 114 In 1975, Times World and
the unions negotiated a CBA. 115 Due to fears stemming from the
increasing automation of the printing process, the union and Times World

107. See, e.g., Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d at 788-89; Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local
2300, United Auto. Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers, 942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir.
1991); Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 831-32 (4th Cir. 1985) (all holding that
the collateral test should be used to analyze the applicability of a CBA’s arbitration clause to
a related side agreement).
108. Cornell Univ., 942 F.2d at 140.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 771 F.2d at 832.
114. Id. at 829-30.
115. Id. at 830.

250

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:1

entered into a side agreement, which contained provisions guaranteeing
lifetime employment to certain printers. 116 In the 1980s, Times World fell
on hard times and reduced its staff. Adkins was one of the printers
terminated despite the protection afforded under the side agreement. 117
Unlike many of the later scope test decisions, which acknowledge the
existence of the conflicting points of view in this area, Adkins does not
even mention the scope test. Whereas a court utilizing the scope test would
examine the breadth of the CBA’s arbitration clause and then determine
whether or not this side agreement would fall under the arbitration clause,
the Fourth Circuit’s analysis follows a decidedly different direction.
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis turns on whether or not the side
agreement could be considered a part of the CBA. 118 In instances where a
clear connection between the two exists, the courts can hold that the side
agreement is not actually a separate side agreement at all, but instead a part
of the main CBA, and thereby subject to the arbitration clause. 119
However, if the side agreement appears to be too separate from or too far
removed from the CBA, then courts may rule that the arbitration clause is
inapplicable. 120 The Fourth Circuit listed several factors that should be
considered in determining whether a side agreement is collateral: the
language of the side agreement, the negotiation process, and the parties’
understanding of the documents—emphasizing the parties’ understanding
of the documents as two separate agreements or a single agreement. 121
While short in length and somewhat vague regarding the key
determinative factors, the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Adkins lays the
groundwork for the collateral test, which is further developed by the
Second and Eighth Circuits.
2.

The Second Circuit

In 1991, the Second Circuit adopted the collateral test in Cornell
University v. UAW Local 2300. 122 Cornell University is notable because it
is one of the first cases that explicitly used the term “collateral.” 123 The
rationale in Cornell University built upon the groundwork laid by the
Fourth Circuit in Adkins and differentiated between the scope and collateral
tests more clearly.
116. The side agreement guaranteed the employment of certain workers to a retirement
age set by the union. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 831-32.
119. Adkins, 771 F.2d at 831-32
120. Id.
121. Id. at 831.
122. Cornell, 942 F.2d at 138.
123. Id. at 140.

2008]

ARBITRATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

251

The Local 2300 Union represented a segment of employees at Cornell
University. 124 In 1988, the union and the University entered into a fouryear CBA, which contained a broad arbitration clause. 125 The arbitration
clause stated that “any matter involving the interpretation or application of
this Agreement which alleges a violation of the rights of an employee or
the Union under the terms of this Agreement” was an arbitrable
grievance. 126
One of the most contentious issues between the union and the
University was the burgeoning cost of health care. 127 The union
incorporated several of its healthcare proposals into a letter, which
eventually became the side agreement at issue in the case. 128 When the
University attempted to take an action contrary to the terms of the letter,
the union sought redress through the procedures outlined in the arbitration
clause of the CBA. 129
The union attempted to sway the Court to employ the scope test by
drawing the Court’s attention to Warrior, the case most often cited in
support of the scope test. 130 Given the broad applicability of the arbitration
clause at question in this case, it seems likely that the Court would have
found the arbitration clause to be applicable had the scope test been
utilized. However, the Court ultimately ruled against the union and
adopted the collateral test, as first seen in Adkins. 131
Previously in Pitta v. Hotel Ass’n of New York City, Inc., 132 the
Second Circuit held that a contract that lacked an arbitration clause, but
was meant to serve as a supplement to a contract with an arbitration clause,
could utilize the latter contract’s arbitration clause. Following this
precedent, the Court argued that it should extend the Pitta reasoning to
include cases where the contract is collateral, not just cases where the
contract is supplementary. 133 Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit

124. Id. at 139.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Cornell, 942 F.2d at 138.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 140.
131. Id.
132. Pitta v. Hotel Ass’n of New York City, Inc., 806 F.2d 419, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1986).
133. The Second Circuit provided an interesting analysis in order to reach its use of the
collateral test, essentially arguing that it had already effectively been using the collateral test
for some time prior to the Cornell decision without calling it as much. The Court cited
several prior Second Circuit cases as controlling on this issue, making them the building
blocks of what would be dubbed the “collateral test.” See Pitta v. Hotel Ass’n of New York
City, Inc., 806 F.2d 419, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1986); Associated Brick Mason Contractors of
Greater New York, Inc. v. Harrington, 820 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1987). Cornell, therefore,
appears to be better understood as the first instance in which the Second Circuit placed all of
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provided no clear guidelines for determining whether to deem a contract
collateral, and instead relied on a facial judgment of the side agreement. 134
3.

The Eighth Circuit

In 2005, the Eighth Circuit in United Steelworkers of America v.
Duluth Clinic, Ltd. became the most recent circuit to adopt the collateral
test. 135 The Eighth Circuit’s adoption of the collateral test is important
because the Court’s opinion is the most well-rounded and highly informed
opinion to embrace the principle. While not as thoroughly reasoned as the
later scope test decisions, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in this case presents
the most in-depth argument in favor of the application of the collateral test.
In early 2000, the union and the Clinic entered into a series of five
CBAs covering various aspects of employee benefits. 136 Under a separate
letter, the parties drafted an agreement that outlined the payment of various
types of health benefits to retired employees and their spouses. 137 Almost
as soon as the benefits were enacted, the Clinic eliminated the retiree
benefits because, upon further inspection, it was discovered that the
program did not comply with Medicare law. 138 After a year of debate, the
parties reached an impasse, with the Union eventually attempting to file an
unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board. 139
When the Clinic denied that there was a grievance under the CBA, the
Union sought to compel arbitration of the side agreement under the terms
of the CBA’s arbitration clause. 140
At the Union’s urging, the Eighth Circuit began its analysis by looking
at the then-recently decided Dutra case from the Ninth Circuit. 141 After
little consideration, the Court rejected the scope test and utilized the
Second Circuit’s approach. 142 However, the Eighth Circuit’s opinion is
bizarre, as it makes no attempt to rationalize the choice between the two
tests.
What makes the Court’s opinion even stranger is that, barely a
its prior precedent together to create a cognizable set of case law and precedent regarding
this issue. Unlike the Fourth Circuit before it, the Second Circuit provided no clear
guidelines for determining whether to deem a contract collateral, and instead relied on a
facial judgment of the side agreement.
134. Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 2300, United Auto. Aerospace and Agric. Implement
Workers, 942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1991).
135. United Steelworkers v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2005).
136. Id. at 787.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 788.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 413 F.3d at 788.
142. Id.
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paragraph after rejecting the scope test, the Court launches into an analysis
that strongly resembles it. 143 The Court announces that it will first decide
whether the arbitration clause is broadly or narrowly written, which, given
the Dutra precedent, should not be the primary concern of a Court utilizing
the collateral test. 144 After taking a narrow view of the arbitration clause,
the Court then examines the issue of whether or not the side agreement is
collateral to the CBA. 145 In turn, the Eighth Circuit completely adopts the
Second Circuit’s approach. 146 The Court does not adopt the Fourth
Circuit’s factor-based approach and instead merely evaluates whether the
side agreement “may be read as part and parcel of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement or whether it is collateral to it.” 147
The Eighth Circuit seems to envision the collateral test as being a
second prong for the scope test. Unlike the Fourth and Second Circuits,
which place a priority on determining whether or not an agreement is
collateral, the Eighth Circuit puts a great deal of emphasis on determining
the scope of the CBA’s arbitration clause. 148 While claiming to adhere to
the collateral test, the Eighth Circuit has instead embraced a modified form
of the collateral test with some of the principles of the scope test.
4.

The Effect of the Collateral Test

If the scope test is the textualist’s answer to the side agreement
dilemma, then the collateral test is the intentionalist’s answer. The
collateral test is much more respectful of the parties’ intent. It can,
however, be difficult to apply, thus making its results somewhat difficult to
predict. Overall, the collateral test offers a strong alternative to the scope
test.
One of the benefits of the collateral test is that it takes into account
many more factors than the scope test. As illustrated by the Fourth Circuit
in Adkins, a court utilizing the collateral test can look to factors such as the
parties’ understanding and the negotiation process. This is in stark contrast
to the scope test, which focuses primarily on the breadth of the arbitration
clause.
The collateral test’s focus on the parties’ intent yields what can be
seen as a more fair result than the scope test. From a normative standpoint,
it is much more equitable to apply the arbitration clause only to issues that

143. Id.
144. Id. at 789.
145. Id. at 790.
146. Id.
147. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d at 790 (quoting Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 2300,
United Auto. Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers, 942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1991)).
148. Id. at 788.
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the parties intended it to be applied to. If the parties’ intent can be
discovered from the myriad factors available for the court to analyze, then
it would seem proper for the court to respect the parties’ wishes and only
apply the arbitration clause in circumstances where it was meant to be
applied.
The major drawback of the collateral test comes from the divination of
the parties’ intent. The same problems that plague intentionalism plague
the collateral test. It is difficult, if not impossible, to always reliably
determine the parties’ intent. CBAs are massive documents created by
dozens of people, representing many different, and sometimes conflicting,
interests. The idea that a court can reliably look at the CBA and determine
the parties’ intent, no matter how many factors they examine, can come
across as disingenuous. Not every case is as simplistic as Adkins where the
title of the side agreement clearly indicated that the parties intended the
side agreement to be considered part of the CBA. 149 From the standpoint of
judicial efficiency, one can argue that, at the very least, the collateral test
will cause substantially more litigation on the aforementioned issues than
the scope test.
The collateral test, much like the scope test, is not a perfect solution to
the issue of the arbitration of side agreements to CBAs. In situations where
the collateral test works, it works well. It certainly seems preferable to
respect the intentions of the parties and abide by their own interpretation of
their documents. Such agreement, however, is unlikely, and it seems
improbable that intent can be easily or reliably determined in all of the
cases that would present this issue. Overall, while preferable in theory, the
collateral test in practice has major flaws.
III. DETERMINING WHEN A CBA’S ARBITRATION CLAUSE SHOULD BE
APPLIED TO A RELATED SIDE AGREEMENT
Part of what makes the analysis of this circuit split so challenging is
that it involves cases that are nearly forty years old. Not only are many of
the cases dated, but there is also a large gap between when each of the
circuits rendered their decisions on the issue. 150 As times change, the
environments in which decisions are made change as well.
This topic would, seemingly, be a strong candidate for review by the
Supreme Court. It involves a major issue that affects millions of
149. The side agreement to the CBA had the word “addendum” in the title. Adkins, 771
F.2d at 830.
150. Such as the almost twenty year gap between Adkins and Koven. See United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 F.3d 271 (6th Cir. 2007); United
Steelworkers v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2005); Inlandboatmens Union of
Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2002).

2008]

ARBITRATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

255

Americans, 151 and it has left a split among the circuits, as they are almost
evenly divided between the two tests, with four favoring the scope test and
three favoring the collateral test. However, it seems highly unlikely that
the Court would be willing to grant certiorari on this issue, because there
has not been a strong push for it. Furthermore, even though the circuit split
has existed for over twenty years, only one of the aforementioned casesAdkins 152 —actually applied for certiorari, 153 though the petition was denied
by the Supreme Court. 154 This phenomenon could exist for any number of
reasons, but it appears to indicate that there is a lack of interest in litigating
this issue at the Supreme Court.
Another important factor indicating unlikelihood that the Supreme
Court would grant certiorari is that despite its broad effects, this is a highly
technical issue that deals with a very specialized area of the law. The Court
has already indicated in the Steelworkers Trilogy and in Warrior that it
would prefer to pass collective bargaining disputes to arbitrators. 155 The
Court justified this by arguing that arbitration would lead to increased
industrial stability. 156 As noted above, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed
its stance on arbitration on multiple occasions. 157 Furthermore, given the
low number of cases to which the Court grants certiorari, it seems unlikely
that the Court would grant it here because of the implications of upsetting
industrial stability by ruling on this issue. Even when framed as an issue of
intentionalism versus textualism, it is not clear how the Court would rule.
This author’s prediction is that given the Court’s current composition, the
justices would likely rule in favor of the textualist-based solution found in
the scope test.
Is the scope test, however, the decision that the Court should actually
reach? Both tests present excellent solutions to the problem, yet both have
distinctive strengths and weaknesses.
One can argue that the collateral test is superior to the scope test
because it better addresses the parties’ intent. By analyzing factors,
including the negotiation process and the parties’ subjective belief of
whether the side agreement was to be covered by the CBA’s arbitration
clause, the collateral test, if it can genuinely and accurately be applied in a
majority of real world settings, provides the best chance of assuring a result
151. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that over 15.7 million Americans are
members of unions. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members In 2007
(Jan. 25, 2008) (on file with author).
152. Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 829 (4th Cir. 1985).
153. Adkins v. Time-World Corp., 474 U.S. 1109, 1109 (1986).
154. Id.
155. See Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599; Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363
U.S. at 578.
156. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 578.
157. See supra Part II (discussing the cases that utilize the scope test).
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that is most in tune with the parties’ original hopes for the contract.
Nonetheless, the collateral test’s drawbacks ultimately make the scope
test superior. The collateral test is unable to function in situations where
the intent of the parties is unclear or non-existent. Modern labor
negotiations are amazingly complex, with many parties arguing over
numerous issues. The existence of these contentious side agreements
displays the difficulty inherent in modern labor negotiations. If labor
negotiations were simple, then there would be no need to amend the
negotiations later with the related side agreements that have perplexed the
circuit courts.
Admittedly, there are some cases that appear to suggest that a court
should be able to reasonably determine the intent of the parties. In Adkins,
for example, the title given to the related side agreement made it clear that
the parties intended for the side agreement to be considered part of the
main CBA, rather than as a distinct agreement. 158 The Second, Fourth, and
Eighth Circuits, however, seem to be under the impression that cases like
Adkins will be the norm. I would argue that, instead, Adkins and its
progenies are outliers and do not represent what a court should reasonably
expect to encounter when examining side agreements. In analogizing to
criminal law, there will always be certain cases where the perpetrator is
caught red-handed with a smoking gun. However, for every obvious case,
there are other cases that are infinitely more complex.
Similarly, there will always be cases like Adkins where a court
immediately determines the parties’ intent. But, given the complexity of
the negotiations involved, it is naïve to expect that a court will be able to
magically interpret the parties’ intentions in every case. The collateral test
does nothing to prepare a court to deal with cases where the intent of the
parties is unclear.
The scope test is superior because it counters this failing. Rather than
search for intent by examining the parties’ conduct, its textualism-focused
analysis infers intent only through examination of the finalized CBA. The
scope test does not rely on judgments from obtuse incentives that may have
motivated the parties when creating the initial agreements. By only
looking at the scope of the CBA’s arbitration clause, the scope test prevents
itself from falling subject to the inherent unreliability of the collateral test.
Whereas the collateral test fails in situations where the parties’ intent is
unclear or cannot be divined through a thorough examination of all
available evidence, the scope test prevails.
The scope test is also much easier to utilize. Contracting parties
should be able to easily look to the scope of their arbitration clauses and
determine if subsequent agreements will fall subject to arbitration. If the

158. Adkins, 771 F.2d at 829.
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parties wish to prevent arbitration in later agreements, they need only
narrow the arbitration clause or state that the arbitration clause is not
applicable in the side agreement. For both courts and potential litigants,
the scope test presents a much simpler analysis. Rather than focusing on
the complexities of analyzing an entire collective bargaining situation, the
courts can address a single provision, and in turn, learn virtually all the
information necessary to render an informed decision.
Returning to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dutra, the ease of use
provided by the scope test will create much greater industrial stability than
the collateral test. 159 If both parties to a contract and the courts can easily
determine the situations in which it is appropriate to extend arbitration
clause coverage, then the stability the Supreme Court aimed to create in
Warrior and the Steelworkers Trilogy will come to fruition. 160 The
collateral test is simply too complex to produce stability, which is valued
not only in labor law, but in all of American jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court may never address the issue of when to extend
arbitration clause coverage to side agreements to CBAs. As the
international economy grows, labor disputes are inevitable. In the past ten
years, the circuits have begun to decide these cases in a much quicker
succession than one would have anticipated, given the long spans of time
between the earliest cases involved. 161 It seems a foregone conclusion that
the remaining circuits will undoubtedly have to determine which of these
tests presents the best way to settle future collective bargaining disputes. It
is the opinion of this author that the remaining circuits, and the Supreme
Court itself, should follow the scope test asserted by the Third, Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. While the collateral test presents a viable
solution to this problem, the scope test, for all of the aforementioned
reasons, is a far superior approach.

159. Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2002)
160. See also United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960)
(discussing the stabilizing influence of arbitration when it addresses all disputes under an
agreement).
161. There was a nearly twenty-year gap between Koven and its nearest successor
Adkins.

